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The World Economy 
remained unchanged compared with the f i rs t 
quarter of the year. Slow US output 
growth continues to be the main depressing 
influence with US indust r ia l production 
fa l l ing by 0.5? between the f i r s t and 
second q u a r t e r s , while European OECD 
countries increased t h e i r i n d u s t r i a l 
performance on average by 0.5% over the 
same per iod. Japanese product ion, 
however, largely remained unchanged. By 
August of this year total OECD industrial 
production had r isen by 1.2$ during the 
preceding twelve months , w i th US 
production exhibiting a small increase of 
only 0.3%, Japan's production actually 
f a l l i n g by 1.7% and, in c o n t r a s t , 
production in the European OECD countries 
r is ing by 1.5%. 
OVERVIEW 
Despite the marked reduc t ion in o i l 
pr ices , levels of nominal i n t e re s t ra tes 
lower than any experienced over the 
previous five years, inf la t ion a t i t s 
lowest point for over twenty years and, 
following the Plaza agreement, the smooth 
decline in the value of the dollar against 
the Yen and the Deutschmark, the prospects 
for f a s t e r and more balanced world 
economic growth are s t i l l unce r t a in . 
There are some signs of recovery in 
Europe which may intensify and spread to 
the US and Japan next year. The size of 
the US budget deficit, the resulting trade 
imbalances, and the reluctance of the West 
Germans and Japanese to administer a 
fiscal stimulus to their economies, remain 
the key policy issues. 
MACROECOHOMIC TRENDS 
In the second quarter of 1986 aggregate 
indust r ia l growth in the OECD countries 
During the past four years the US economy 
has experienced sustained economic growth. 
This growth has been stimulated by a large 
budget de f ic i t and has provided the main 
impetus for the marked improvement in the 
growth of the world economy in the 
subsquent per iod. US growth was 
expected to be even stronger in 1986. As 
reported in the August Commentary a 
combination of factors: lower in te res t 
r a t e s , lower inf la t ion and the wealth 
effects of a booming stock market, were 
expected to provide a substantial boost to 
domestic demand. In a d d i t i o n , the 
depreciation of the dollar coupled with 
spare indus t r ia l capacity and low stock 
r a t i o s , was expected to reduce the trade 
deficit by raising domestic production for 
export and res t ra ining the growth of 
imports. 
Estimates of the growth in gross national 
product (GNP) in the second q u a r t e r , 
however, appeared to suggest that growth 
was in fact decelerating. In the three 
months to June revised figures indicated 
that GNP growth had slowed, falling from a 
real annual ra te of 3.8% in the f i r s t 
q u a r t e r to 0.6% in the second. 
Preliminary figures for the third quarter, 
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suggesting that GNP growth had accelerated 
to an annual ra te of 2.5%, helped to ease 
the pessimism. The US Administration 
therefore remained optimistic about future 
performance predicting 4% growth for the 
final quarter of the year. However, even 
if th i s prediction i s real ised growth 
w o u l d s t i l l f a l l b e l o w t h e 
Administration's target of 3.2? for 1986 
which, as the August Commentary noted, 
represented a downward revision of the 
Administration's e a r l i e r forecast of 4% 
growth for this year. 
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Several factors account for the faltering 
of US growth in the ea r l i e r part of 1986. 
In particular, there has been retrenchment 
in the domestic oil industry following the 
reduction in o i l pr ices , the farming 
sector remains weak, due to worldwide 
changes in the s t ructure of agr icul ture , 
and pr ivate sector investment is subject 
to a downward trend. On the other hand, 
increased disposable incomes due to the 
decline in o i l prices and lower in t e re s t 
r a tes have raised consumer spending and 
h o u s i n g e x p e n d i t u r e s . Consumer 
expend i tu re , and to a l e s s e r ex ten t 
Government expenditure, have been the main 
positive influences on recent US economic 
growth. Indeed with expenditures on 
consumer durables, par t icu lar ly cars , 
especially buoyant, most of the increased 
growth in the third quarter was accounted 
for by the r i s e in consumer spending. 
However, with domestic demand growing at 
approximately twice the rate of domestic 
production, a high and increasing trade 
de f i c i t continues to be the pr inciple 
constra int on the growth of domestic 
production. 
Since 1982 the annual trade deficit in the 
US has risen progressively from US$36.4bn 
to US$124.4bn during 1985. In the f i r s t 
quarter of 1986 there was a slight fa l l in 
the de f i c i t from US$37.4bn to US$36.5bn. 
In the second quarter the de f i c i t was 
largely unchanged a t US$36bn. By July 
the deficit for the f i rs t seven months of 
this year stood at US$94.7bn and by August 
i t was running a t an annual r a t e of 
US$170bn, considerably greater than the 
previous year. 
The recent increases in the US trade 
d e f i c i t have taken place aga in s t a 
background of a depreciation of the dollar 
against the Deutschemark and the Yen of 
over 40% since i t s peak in March 1985. 
The fa i lu re of the US trade de f i c i t to 
adjust favourably is in part accounted for 
by the so-called J-curve effect which, as 
noted in previous Commentaries, results in 
the prices of traded goods reacting more 
quickly than trade volumes to exchange 
ra te changes. On th i s reasoning we 
should expect the US trade def ic i t to 
improve even tua l ly and cu r r en t IMF 
forecasts suggest that the improvement 
should be evident in 1987, with further 
improvements in 1988 and l a t e r years. 
However, the slow responsiveness of import 
volumes in to the US and the consequent 
sluggish response of domestic output to 
the depreciation of the dol lar have, as 
noted in the August Commentary, been 
compounded by the ab i l i ty of importers 
into the US, particularly the Japanese, to 
absorb the dol lar price effects of the 
cu r r ency change by a l o w e r i n g of 
p r e v i o u s l y high p r o f i t m a r g i n s . 
Moreover, the value of the dol lar has 
hardly changed against the currencies of 
key competitor countries such as Taiwan, 
South Korea and Canada. On top of t h i s 
i t i s evident that two key s t ruc tura l 
problems are l imi t ing the effect of the 
exchange rate adjustment in improving the 
current account def ic i t . F i r s t , many 
commentators believe that there has been a 
s h i f t in the p a t t e r n of comparat ive 
advantage away from t r a d i t i o n a l US 
exporting indus t r ies . Secondly, the 
savings shor t fa l l in the US continues to 
pers i s t because of a lack of effective 
action to reduce the Administration's 
large Budget deficit which is greater than 
expected due to sluggish growth. This in 
turn has th rea tened the ef f icacy of 
Congressional attempts to reduce i t such 
as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollins Budget reform 
law. 
4 
The f a i l u r e of the d e p r e c i a t i o n of the 
d o l l a r t o improve the t r ade d e f i c i t and 
reduce t h e c o n s t r a i n t on US domest ic 
growth has led t o fur ther requests by the 
US A d m i n i s t r a t i o n for o the r c o u n t r i e s , 
especial ly Japan and West Germany, to help 
adjust the t rade imbalances by promoting 
f a s t e r domest ic economic growth. These 
r e q u e s t s have been accompanied by the 
implied th rea t tha t f a i l u re to take act ion 
w i l l r e s u l t i n the US A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
f ind ing i t d i f f i c u l t t o r e s i s t domest ic 
p r o t e c t i o n i s t p r e s s u r e s and t h a t US 
monetary policy may have t o be relaxed t o 
secure a f u r t h e r , perhaps l e s s smooth, 
d e p r e c i a t i o n of the d o l l a r a g a i n s t the 
Deutschemark and the Yen. 
Japanese GNP f e l l by 0.5? in r e a l t e rms 
dur ing the f i r s t q u a r t e r of the y e a r , the 
f i r s t q u a r t e r l y r e d u c t i o n in GNP for 
e l e v e n y e a r s . There was a s l i g h t 
recovery in t h e second q u a r t e r wi th r e a l 
GNP r i s ing by 0.9%. The 40$ appreciation 
of the Yen a g a i n s t the d o l l a r s i n c e the 
second q u a r t e r of 1985 has undoubtedly 
been the major factor res t ra in ing Japan's 
growth. By July of t h i s year i ndus t r i a l 
p roduc t ion and manufactur ing o u t p u t in 
p a r t i c u l a r had both f a l l e n by 1.7? over 
t h e p r e c e d i n g y e a r . Th i s i n p a r t 
r e f l e c t s the d e c l i n e in expor t volumes 
which f e l l by 0.9? in the year t o Ju ly 
1986. While expor t volumes a r e now 
declining the f a l l i s small compared with 
the a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h e Yen r e s u l t i n g in 
the dol la r value of exports increasing by 
a m a s s i v e 22% ove r t h e same p e r i o d , 
another example of the J -curve e f f e c t . 
On t h e i m p o r t s i d e , t h e r e was a 44? 
d e c l i n e i n t h e c o s t of m i n e r a l f u e l 
impor t s which c o n s i s t l a r g e l y of o i l . 
The volume of non -o i l impor ts i nc reased 
but w i th lower Yen p r i c e s the o v e r a l l 
e f f e c t was t o r a i s e the d o l l a r va lue of 
impor t s by only 0.8? in the f i r s t h a l f of 
1986. The current account surplus has in 
consequence increased markedly reaching a 
record l e v e l of US$35.8bn in the f i r s t 
ha l f of the y e a r , 80? h igher than the 
su rp lus in the corrsponding per iod of 
1985. Some forecasters believe tha t the 
su rp lu s could be as high as US$90bn for 
1986, which i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y h igher than 
the record US$55bn s u r p l u s recorded in 
1985. These l a r g e s u r p l u s e s a r e l i k e l y 
to con t inue i f t he p r i c e of o i l remains 
reasonably s t a b l e in the US$14 t o US$17 
range, the Yen continues to appreciate and 
t h e r e i s no major s t i m u l u s to domest ic 
demand. Only i f the Yen s t a b i l i s e s w i l l 
the J-curve effect begin to unwind. 
The August Commentary noted t h a t the 
Japanese Government faced a dilemma in 
t r y i n g to r e c o n c i l e i t s commitment to a 
policy of f i s ca l aus te r i ty with increasing 
in te rna t iona l pressure, par t icu la r ly from 
t h e US, t o s t i m u l a t e t h e g rowth of 
domestic demand. The effect of the Yen's 
appreciat ion on the growth of the domestic 
economy, pa r t i cu l a r ly manufactur ing , has 
now added d o m e s t i c p r e s s u r e fo r a 
r e l a x a t i o n of f i s c a l po l i cy . But the 
measures in t roduced so f a r suggest t h a t 
the Government i s proceeding cautiously on 
the f i sca l f ront . 
The main at tempts to s t imulate the economy 
have been i n t h e e a s i n g of mone ta ry 
c o n d i t i o n s . The o f f i c i a l d i scoun t r a t e 
was reduced three times beween January and 
July r e s u l t i n g in a f a l l from 5? t o 3.5?, 
the lowest r a t e during the postwar period. 
A f u r t h e r cu t of 0.5% p o i n t s occurred 
fo l lowing the c u r r e n c y s t a b i l i s a t i o n 
agreement with the US a t the beginning of 
November. The money supply (M2 p lus 
c e r t i f i c a t e s of deposit) was r i s ing a t 9? 
during the f i r s t three months of the year 
f a l l i n g t o a monthly average of 8.5? in 
the subsequent four months to July, a ra te 
of growth only s l i g h t l y h igher than the 
preceding year. I t i s , however, unlikely 
t h a t t h e s l i g h t e a s i n g in mone ta ry 
c o n d i t i o n s w i l l have much i m p a c t on 
domest ic demand, the c u r r e n t account 
s u r p l u s and hence on the demand for US 
exports . 
The West German Government has also come 
under pressure from the US Administration 
t o r e l a x monetary and f i s c a l po l i cy to 
boos t the p r o s p e c t s of world economic 
g r o w t h and h e l p r e d u c e t h e US t r a d e 
de f i c i t . Growth i s expected to be about 
3% t h i s year and the Government b e l i e v e s 
t h i s i s s u f f i c i e n t no t t o w a r r a n t a 
further re laxat ion of monetary and f i sca l 
p o l i c y . Yet the Government's c r i t i c s 
argue t h a t 3? , i f i t m a t e r i a l i s e s , i s 
s t i l l well below the economy's po ten t ia l . 
The West German Government's unwillingness 
to s t imulate domestic demand stems largely 
from concern about the e f f e c t s of the 
appreciation of the Deutschemark on export 
and impor t volumes. The nominal t r ade 
s u r p l u s inc reased from DM20.5bn in the 
l a s t q u a r t e r of 1985, to DM25bn in the 
f i r s t quarter of 1986, r i s ing to DM27bn in 
t h e second q u a r t e r . However, t h i s 
i n c r e a s e i s l a r g e l y due to the J -curve 
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effect of the appreciating Deutschemark 
coupled a l so with the e f f ec t of the 
decline in oi l prices in improving the 
terms of trade. The greater future growth 
in import volumes, which were 7% higher in 
the f irs t few months of 1986 compared with 
the same period in 1985, and slower growth 
in export volumes, currently growing a t 
21, i s expected by the Government to 
reduce the surplus significantly in 1987. 
However, West Germany's f ive lead ing 
economic research insti tutes have recently 
predicted that the sharp r i s e in import 
volumes is likely to produce only a modest 
fall in the trade surplus. They forecast 
the current account surplus to be DM60bn 
in 1987 compared with DM70bn in 1986. It 
is therefore probable that domestic and 
international pressures on West Germany to 
stimulate domestic demand are unlikely to 
abate. 
The ra te of inf la t ion has, on average, 
progressively fallen in the world economy 
over the l a s t few years. Reductions in 
oil and commodity prices have reinforced 
the t rend begun by t i g h t e r monetary 
p o l i c i e s in the major i n d u s t r i a l 
economies. Also, as noted in the August 
Commentary, the significant depreciation 
of the dol la r , against most but not a l l 
currencies, has had a favourable impact on 
the domestic prices of these countries due 
to the reduction in the import prices of 
goods denominated in US dollars. 
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The annualised r a t e of inf la t ion for the 
OECD fell from 4.5% in the fourth quarter 
of 1985 to 2.9% in the f i r s t quarter of 
t h i s year. By August, following further 
reductions, the annual ra te of inf la t ion 
stood at 2.4*. While r e l a t ive inf la t ion 
ra tes have continued to narrow, clear 
d i f f e r e n c e s s t i l l e x i s t between the 
principal economies of the OECD. 
Both Japan and Germany have been 
experiencing negative inflation rates with 
p r i c e s f a l l i n g by 0.2% and 0.4% 
respectively in the year to August. The 
US, despite the marked depreciation of the 
d o l l a r , which would be expected to 
inc rease i n f l a t i o n th rough upward 
movements in d o l l a r import p r i c e s , 
experienced a ra te of inf la t ion over the 
year to August of 1.6%, which was lower 
than the OECD average. This provides 
further indi rec t evidence of importers 
into the US responding to the depreciation 
of the dollar by reducing profit margins. 
OECD Europe and the EEC, on the other 
hand, while experiencing lower inflation, 
s t i l l had in the year to August, r a tes 
higher than the OECD average of 3.9% and 
3% respectively. 
The s ignif icant f a l l in oi l prices since 
the end of 1985 has been the key influence 
on dec l i n ing i n f l a t i o n r a t e s in the 
i n d u s t r i a l i s e d economies during the 
subsequent period. The OECD has estimated 
that on average the ra te of inf la t ion in 
indus t r ia l i sed countries w i l l have been 
reduced by 1.3% po in t s during 1986 
following an assumed fal l of US$11 in the 
price of oi l . As late as autumn las t year 
o i l prices stood a t nearly US$30 per 
barrel then fell rapidly to US$6 for some 
blends of Arabian oil during the middle of 
the year. The severe decline in the o i l 
p r i c e was - p a r t l y - the unintended 
outcome of a de l ibera te policy by Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait, announced l a s t 
December, to raise their market shares to 
levels more in keeping with the size of 
the i r r e l a t i ve o i l reserves. In 1979, 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) produced 56% of OPEC's output but by 
1985 their share only accounted for 45% of 
the OPEC t o t a l . Cheating on production 
quotas by other OPEC members, encouraged 
by the high o i l pr ices , was viewed by the 
major oil-producing Gulf s t a t e s as the 
principal reason for t h e i r dec l in ing 
shares. The abandoning of production 
constra ints precipi tated the o i l price 
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f a l l . 
I t i s a lmos t c e r t a i n t h a t n e i t h e r Saudi 
Arabia nor Kuwait would have expected the 
p r i c e of o i l t o f a l l so qu ick ly or by so 
much, reducing the income of OPEC members 
by an estimated £59bn during 1986. In May 
the Gulf Co-opera t ion Council - which 
includes the main Gulf o i l s t a t e s - sought 
t o r e s t o r e o i l p r i c e s t o a US$17-US$19 
range . The August Coaaentary d i scussed 
the outcome of s e v e r a l subsequent OPEC 
meetings in Geneva in l a t e July and early 
August where a temporary agreement was 
f i n a l l y reached on a r e d u c t i o n in ou tpu t 
of 3.5m b a r r e l s per day for a twomonth 
period beginning in September. Oil pr ices 
subsequent ly r o s e by more than 50% to 
around US$15 per ba r r e l . OPEC reconvened 
in Geneva in October in an a t t e m p t t o 
e x t e n d t h e Augus t agreement . Amidst 
c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n members f o r h i g h e r 
q u o t a s , s p e c i f i c a l l y over the a l loca t ion 
of an e x t r a 200,000 b a r r e l s per day, only 
1.2% of t h e a g r e e d c e i l i n g of 16.8m 
b a r r e l s pe r d a y , a n o t h e r t e m p o r a r y 
agreement was reached un t i l December. 
The s u b s e q u e n t s a c k i n g of t h e l o n g -
s t a n d i n g S a u d i O i l M i n i s t e r , Ske ikh 
Yamani, i n l a t e October , appeared t o 
i n d i c a t e a s h i f t of emphasis in Saudi 
policy towards h igher p r i c e s r a t h e r than 
h ighe r p roduc t ion and recovery of market 
s h a r e . But i t i s s t i l l not c l e a r whether 
a t future OPEC meetings Saudi Arabia w i l l 
be prepared to offer to reduce production 
to achieve i t s object ive of ra is ing pr ices 
t o US$18 pe r b a r r e l . N e v e r t h e l e s s , 
con t inu ing f a l l s in t h e o i l p r i c e appear 
unlikely and the prospect of a longer-term 
agreement on production l eve l s and quotas 
in December now appears l e s s improbable . 
However, i t i s unlikely tha t the price of 
o i l w i l l r i s e by much above present l eve l s 
in the s h o r t term due t o the l a r g e o i l 
s t o c k s held by o i l consumers which have 
been b u i l t up during the recent period of 
very low pr ices . 
LABOUR NUKET 
Despi te the r e d u c t i o n of i n f l a t i o n and 
evidence of recovery of output in Europe, 
unemployment remains largely unchanged in 
OECD c o u t r i e s . In the l a s t two q u a r t e r s 
of 1985 and the f i r s t q u a r t e r of 1986 the 
s t a n d a r d i s e d r a t e of unemployment in the 
OECD remained a t around the 81 mark. Also 
wide d i f f e r e n c e s c o n t i n u e t o p e r s i s t 
between the unemployment r a t e s of major 
OECD count r ies . 
In the US, unemployment dec l ined during 
the l a s t t h r e e q u a r t e r s of 1985. In the 
f i r s t quar ter and second quar ters of 1986 
unemployment rose s l i g h t l y . From the 
f i n a l q u a r t e r of 1985 unemployment rose 
from 6.9* to 7.1% in the second quarter of 
t h i s year , t hus r e f l e c t i n g the e a r l i e r 
decelerat ion in US growth. Unemployment 
in OECD Europe and the EEC, a t l i t and 
11.9% respectively in the f i r s t quarter of 
t h i s year, remained largely unchanged but 
s t i l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y above both the OECD 
average and the r a t e r u l i n g in the US. 
Within Europe, unemployment fe l l s l igh t ly 
in West Germany in the f i r s t q u a r t e r of 
t h i s year from 8.5% t o 8.4% and remained 
unchanged in the second q u a r t e r . France 
and I t a ly , on the other hand, experienced 
no change in unemployment in the f i r s t 
q u a r t e r of the year wi th r a t e s a t 10% and 
10.9% r e s p e c t i v e l y . But t h e n r a t e s 
inc reased in the second q u a r t e r to 10.3% 
in France and 11.3% in I t a l y . At the 
other extreme l i e s Japanese unemployment, 
which rose to 2.8% in the final quarter of 
1985 t h e n f e l l t o 2.6% in t h e f i r s t 
q u a r t e r of 1986. In the second q u a r t e r a 
s l i g h t i n c r e a s e to 2.7% was recorded and 
by July the r a t e stood a t 2.9%, suggesting 
p e r h a p s t h a t t h e e f f e c t of t h e 
a p p r e c i a t i n g Yen on Japanese growth i s 
beginning to feed i n t o the unemployment 
f igures . 
t*#i '*ts <m *»•* tm *n* >*t? 
Previous Commentaries have noted that the 
outlook with respect to the continuing 
high l e v e l s of unemployment in Europe, 
both in absolute and r e l a t i v e terms, 
remains p e s s i m i s t i c . The reduction in 
demand following the oi l price rise in the 
1970s and the adopt ion by governments of 
t i g h t mone ta ry and f i s c a l p o l i c i e s 
undoubtedly had a s i g n i f i c a n t impact on 
the growth of unemployment in Europe and 
in the res t of the OECD. However, many 
e c o n o m i s t s b e l i e v e t h a t s u p p l y - s i d e 
f a c t o r s have a l s o played a s i g n i f i c a n t 
r o l e bo th in the r e l a t i v e l y g r e a t e r 
i n c r e a s e in unemployment in Europe and 
par t i cu la r ly in the subsequent persistence 
of unemployment a t high leve ls . 
The view most popular amongst European 
governments , which has inf luenced the 
p o l i c i e s a d o p t e d towards the labour 
market, i s that labour market r ig id i t i e s 
a f f e c t i n g agg rega t e labour c o s t s , pay 
d i f f e r e n t i a l s and labour mobility between 
occupations, sec tors and regions, largely 
account for the unemployment problem. 
E v i d e n c e for t h i s view i s l a r g e l y 
impressionistic but i t may be significant 
nonetheless. For example, recent research 
by the OECD found that pay d i f f e r e n t i a l s 
were much smaller in Europe than in the US 
and Japan, and were s t i l l narrowing. On 
the significance of aggregate real labour 
cos ts , the OECD provided a measure of real 
wage rigidity which related the degree of 
responsiveness of money wage changes to 
c h a n g e s in p r i c e s and unemploymen t . 
Countries with a lower responsiveness of 
money wages to prices than to unemployment 
were c l a s s i f i e d a s having r e l a t i v e l y 
f lexib le real wages while those where the 
responsiveness was greater were considered 
to e x h i b i t r e l a t i v e l y r i g i d real wages. 
On the b a s i s of t h i s measure, the OECD 
resea rch shows that c o u n t r i e s with the 
most r i g i d r e a l wages such as Br i ta in , 
and to a l e s se r extent France and Holland, 
have experienced the g r e a t e s t pe rcen tage 
point r i s e in umeployment between 1975 and 
1982. Countries such as the US and Japan, 
with appa ren t ly the most f l e x i b l e real 
wages, experienced the lowes t pe rcen tage 
po in t i n c r e a s e in unemployment over the 
period. 
Such evidence must, however, be t reated as 
i m p r e s s i o n i s t i c because i t i s not c l e a r 
whether p o s s i b l e inf luences other than 
labour market r i g i d i t i e s on the nature and 
pers i s t ence of unemployment have been 
taken into account. One such explanation 
i s that the level of unemployment required 
to maintain a stable rate of inflation may 
increase with the l e v e l of unemployment. 
This f o l l o w s from the b e l i e f that the 
longer a person i s unemployed the l e s s 
marketable h i s or her s erv i ce s are to 
employers and so the search for work i s 
l e s s intensive. I t follows from this that 
the long-term unemployed may exert l i t t l e 
downward pressure on wages. In Europe 
around 60% of the unemployed have been 
without jobs for more than s ix months 
compared with 20% and tOJ in the US and 
Japan r e s p e c t i v e l y . Moreover the 
proportion unemployed for a year or more 
has been running at 40$ in Europe and only 
12% in the US. This would appear to g ive 
some support for current policy efforts in 
Europe which are beginning to focus on the 
long-term unemployed. 
In addi t ion , i t i s a l s o c lear that a lack 
of investment in Europe in the early 1980s 
- which might not be unconnected with 
labour market r ig id i t i e s as well as demand 
deficiency - has resulted, along with the 
scrapping of obsolete plant and machinery, 
in a f a i l u r e to mainta in and b u i l d 
capacity . Current l e v e l s of capacity 
u t i l i sa t ion in Europe are high by previous 
standards given the rate of unemployment. 
Moreover, a r e c e n t study by the EEC 
Commission suggested that the l e v e l of 
capacity in the EEC i s around 15% below 
the level required for ful l employment. 
We cannot be certain as to which of these 
e x p l a n a t i o n s a c c o u n t s b e s t for the 
persistence of unemployment in Europe, or 
whether other explanations not so far 
d i s c u s s e d or i d e n t i f i e d may be more 
relevant. However, i t seems clear that in 
the s h o r t - t e r m a t l e a s t even i f the 
expected improvements in output in the 
world economy m a t e r i a l i s e the impact on 
unemployment in Europe i s unl ike ly to be 
s ignif icant. 
PROGNOSIS 
The two key developments in the world 
economy over the past year have been the 
managed depreciation in the dollar and the 
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fa l l in o i l prices. These developments 
have been associated with a fairly co-
ordinated reduction in nominal interest 
rates and a reduction in inflation and 
inflationary expectations. The favourable 
effects on world economic growth which 
were expected to result from a reduction 
in these imbalances have not y e t 
materialised. However, there are some 
signs of recovery in Europe which may 
intensify and extend to the US and Japan 
next year. Continuing imbalances within 
the world economy suggest that the 
prospects for a sustained increase in 
economic growth in the future are 
nevertheless s t i l l uncertain. 
The fall in oil prices produced a transfer 
of income from oil-producing to o i l -
importing countries which i s estimated to 
have been of the order of US90bn. This 
income gain has fa i l ed to have the 
expected favourable impact on the economic 
performance of the i n d u s t r i a l i s e d 
countries. The oil-producing countries 
have reacted more quickly to fal l ing 
revenues in reducing their expenditures 
than consumers in the o i l - import ing 
countries have reacted in raising their 
expenditures. If the oil price stabilises 
in the US$11 to US$17 range then the 
stimulus to output and trade in the 
industrialised countries should become 
more evident in 1987. However, there 
must be some uncertainty about the future 
course of oil prices in the medium term in 
view of the apparent change in Saudi 
Arabia's policy towards recovery of market 
share. Nevertheless, i t seems unlikely 
that OPEC could sustain a price at US$18 
per barrel and above in the short term 
given both the wide divisions within OPEC 
itself and the large stocks of oil held by 
the oil-importing countries which have 
been built up during the recent period of 
very low prices. 
The smooth depreciation of the dollar, the 
subsequent fall in nominal interest rates 
and the reduction in inflation rates, must 
be viewed as only partial steps towards 
the removal of disequilibria in the world 
economy. The problem of substant ia l 
current account imbalances between the 
Group of Three (G3) countries, US, West 
Germany and Japan, and whether a co-
ordinated strategy can be developed to 
remove them, s t i l l remains. Added to this 
are the pa r t i a l l y related problems of 
t r a d e d i s p u t e s and I n c r e a s i n g 
p r o t e c t i o n i s t p r e s s u r e s , and t he 
continuing debt problems of the developing 
countries, particularly in Latin America. 
The depreciation of the dollar in relation 
to the Yen and D-Mark should, as the J-
Curve effects begin to unwind, start to 
exert downward pressure on the US current 
account def ic i t and the current account 
surpluses in West Germany and Japan in 
1987. However, the solution to the 
problem requires more fundamental action 
than a simple - a l l be i t large -
realignment of exchange rates. In many 
respects the key to the problem l i e s in 
the imbalance in savings and Investment 
behaviour between the US, and Japan and 
West Germany and the fiscal and monetary 
policies adopted in each country. 
The US economy has since 1980 experienced 
a large savings shortfall which increased 
as the budget deficit rose. Tne growth in 
the budget led to Increased Interest rates 
and i n c r e a s e d c a p i t a l i n f l o w s , 
particularly from Japan, to finance the 
def ic i t . This in turn led to an increase 
in the value of the dollar which, in 
combination with the stimulus to domestic 
demand provided by the growing budget 
de f i c i t , served to raise US imports, 
producing a significant deter iorat ion in 
the count ry ' s c u r r e n t account. The 
expansion of US imports and consequent 
growth in world trade resulted in Japan 
and, to a lesser extent, West Germany 
being the principal beneficiaries, leading 
to increasing current account surpluses in 
the two countries. 
In pr inc ip le , imbalances between savings 
and i n v e s t m e n t behav iou r and the 
consequent effects on the current accounts 
of the respective countries need not 
constitute a problem. However, changes in 
d e f i c i t s and su rp luses and policy 
responses within the countries concerned, 
particularly large deficit countries such 
as the US, can prove to be des tabi l i s ing 
to the world economy. The attendant 
effects on capital flows and expectations 
leads to Increased instability in exchange 
rates and interest rates which may tend to 
depress world trade. Moreover, severe 
adjustment problems can occur as domestic 
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economies seek to adjust to the changes. 
The US economy has moved from a posit ion 
of essentially glorying in i t s borrowing 
role to one which began to recognise the 
i m p l i c a t i o n s of a s u b s t a n t i a l t r a d e 
d e f i c i t for domestic manufactur ing, 
agriculture and the oil-producing regions 
of the US. The subsequent policy of 
seeking reductions in the dollar exchange 
ra te has effectively l e f t a substant ia l 
imbalance in monetary and f i sca l policy 
between the US and the r e s t of the 
industrialised world, par t icu la r ly Japan 
and West Germany. For Japan and Germany, 
the key to the problem i s the s ize of the 
US budget deficit which is likely to be in 
excess of US$21 Obn in the current f i sca l 
year . For the US, faced with the 
difficulty of reducing the budget deficit 
in the short run and growing protectionist 
pressures from Congress, re f lec t ing the 
impact of the persisting trade deficit on 
key areas of the US economy, the problem 
would be eased by a r e l a x a t i o n of 
monetary, and particularly fiscal, policy 
in Japan and West Germany. The resulting 
expansion of demand would serve to absorb 
domestic savings and reduce the surplus on 
current account in the two countries. A 
fa i lu re to do th i s would be l ike ly to 
r e su l t in a further depreciation of the 
dol lar and/or the US government being 
unable to r e s i s t domestic p ro tec t ion is t 
pressure, both of which would be damaging 
to West German and Japanese economic 
growth. 
The relationship between the US and these 
two c o u n t r i e s in r e c e n t months has 
t h e r e f o r e been c h a r a c t e r i s e d by 
disagreement on the most a p p r o p r i a t e 
approach to the removal of the imbalances. 
The West German government appears to be 
the most re luc tant to change i t s current 
policy stance. There appears l i t t l e 
likelihood that the Bundesbank will risk a 
further reduction in i t s discount or 
Lombard rates, which currently stand at 3? 
and 5% r e s p e c t i v e l y . A f u r t h e r 
re laxat ion of i n t e r e s t rate policy would 
be un l i ke ly to s t i m u l a t e investment 
overmuch given the current sluggishness of 
world trade and the fact that exports 
account for around one third of West 
German GDP. T r a d i t i o n a l German 
s e n s i t i v i t y about the i n f l a t i o n a r y 
consequences of monetary expansion i s 
therefore likely to prevent further policy 
change in the immediate future. I t also 
appears unlikely that the government will 
bring forward the second stage of i t s 
programme of tax cuts which are currently 
scheduled t o be in t roduced in 1988, 
assuming that the government i s re-elected 
in January. However, a relaxation of 
fiscal policy would appear to be necessary 
both to reduce the trade surplus and to 
maintain the growth of the Germany economy 
by switching from export-led to domestic-
led expansion. In addition, a greater 
wil l ingness, by both West Germany and 
Japan, to lend to less-developed countries 
in Latin America in particular would help 
these debtor countries di rect ly and, by 
enabling them to import more from the US, 
would also indirect ly help the US to 
reduce i t s trade deficit. 
The Japanese, while appearing to be more 
conciliatory towards US demands, are s t i l l 
nevertheless re luc tant to relax f i sca l 
policy to boost domestic demand by an 
amount suff ic ient to have much effect on 
the i r trade surplus and the US trade 
de f i c i t . The Japanese Finance Minister 
r ecen t ly concluded an exchange r a t e 
s t a b i l i s a t i o n agreement wi th the US 
Treaury Secretary. This appears to seek 
to link the Yen to the dollar in the range 
Y160 to Y170. The Japanese therefore 
appear to have managed to put a floor 
under the dollar, which will help protect 
Japanese export-led growth, without making 
any s u b s t a n t i a l concess ions on the 
expansion of domestic fiscal and monetary 
policy which would help stimulate demands 
for US imports. The Japanese agreed to 
cut thei r discount ra te by a further 0.5J 
point but t h i s i s unlikely to have much 
effect in s t imulat ing an economy where 
c red i t i s already cheap. And, the recent 
supplementary budget i s expected only to 
have a minimal effect in ra is ing the 
growth of the Japanese economy. 
Overa l l then the key i s sues for the 
development of the world economy remain: 
the size of the US budget def ic i t ; the 
s t i l l high levels of real interest rates; 
and the reluctance of the West German and 
Japanese governments to r e lax f i s c a l 
p o l i c y . W h i l e g r o w t h in t h e 
indus t r ia l i sed countries should improve 
next year, largely due to the delayed 
effects of the f a l l in o i l pr ices , future 
balanced growth requires the satisfactory 
resolution of these issues. 
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